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The issues of affordability and access to higher education are widespread among 
college campuses and throughout the national political debate. As institutions attempt to 
combat rising tuition, many schools have implemented guaranteed, or fixed rate, tuition 
programs (GTP). These programs serve as a promise to students, pledging their tuition 
will not rise throughout their degree path, and participating institutions assert that these 
programs are successful at providing an affordable education. I investigated these 
claims by analyzing what the factors are to implement a guaranteed program, and the 
impact of these programs on outcome variables such as completion. 
Through available institution and student information, I compiled a list of the 140 
public and private institutions that have implemented a guaranteed program. With this 
base list, I presented details and criteria of each unique program through data available 
on college websites and surveying enrollment and finance offices of participating 
universities. I relied on university data derived from the College Scorecard Report, 
including but not limited to enrollment rates, retention rates, state appropriation, student 
identifiers, and net price. Using a variation on a time series regression, and data 
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spanning a period of eleven years, I analyzed patterns leading up to and following the 
start of these programs. I found there were some patterns indicating small effects of 
GTPs and other factors both before and after the implementation of a program. 
However, while some effects were statistically significant, the effects were very small 
in magnitude.  None of the quantified effects analyzed in the empirical model were 
found to have a dramatic enough impact to credit the GTPs I reviewed as causing the 
size of effects the educational institutions generally intended, as represented in the 
communications of institutions to students and their families.   
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Chapter 1: Background 
1.1 Introduction to Guaranteed Tuition Proposals  
Two of the most pressing issues present in higher education in the United States 
are affordability and access (US DOE). As the cost of higher education rises and state 
appropriations dwindle, universities become more tuition dependent. To combat this, 
public and private universities across the nation have developed and are marketing 
alternative tuition programs that strive to provide educational opportunities and 
maintain academic excellence while avoiding budget shortfalls. One new program that 
has gained in popularity is a fixed-rate or guaranteed tuition program (GTP). By 2011, 
267 institutions in 44 different states had adopted a fixed-rate or GTP plan (IPEDS). 
Each campus that adopts a GTP implements a different set of specific policies, 
but the core of the programs remain the same: the college fixes the tuition rate for a set 
period of time for students, in order to prevent increases in tuition year by year. Each 
year, the incoming class is considered a cohort, and they are given a set tuition amount 
to pay for a determined period of time, usually between four and five years.  This fixed 
amount is advertised as a promise and is aimed to provide financial certainty to 
prospective students and their families by addressing the issues of unpredictability in 
college tuition.  
  While there are similarities across the programs, GTPs vary in five main ways. 
The first is whether students have the option to choose the program, or whether it is 
mandatory for all students. If it is optional, it will either be an opt-in or opt-out 
program, which have different rates of participation. Second, the eligibility of the 
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student changes with different programs. Depending on the campus, resident, non-
resident, or all undergraduate students are eligible for GTPs. Third, campuses vary on 
how many years the program is guaranteed, and what happens if a student does not 
graduate during the guaranteed time. Most programs guarantee the tuition rates for four 
to five years, and at the completion of the fixed time students either pay a non-
guaranteed rate, the rate of the incoming cohort, or the rate of the cohort following 
them, the next class. Fourth, transfer students are treated differently depending on the 
program. For some, transfer students are not eligible for the fixed tuition rate. For 
others, transfer students are eligible for the full time allotted or a select number of years 
depending on the amount of credits they have when admitted to the college. Lastly, 
some institutions include all tuition and fees in the guaranteed rate, others include some 
fees with the tuition, and still others only guarantee the tuition rate.  
To keep the guarantee program revenue neutral, the student pays an amount 
higher than their cost of education during their first two years of study, and it only 
becomes a financial incentive the last two years of a student’s time enrolled (Morphew, 
39). This system of overpaying in the early period manifests itself in decision-making 
behavior in two principal ways. First, prospective students and families suffer from 
sticker-shock because the first year’s guaranteed rate is significantly higher than the 
comparable rate of a year-by-year program. Second, rational behavior predicts future 
discounting, meaning that people give more weight to decisions and utility received or 
loss in the present than the future. Therefore, the high initial price will be perceived 
with more weight than the cost savings three and four years through the course of study. 
To overcome these initial responses to the program, GTPs require an eloquent, targeted 
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marketing strategy for universities to ensure that prospective students are not 
discouraged to attend universities with GTPs (Nicoolescu, 38).  
Universities that have implemented these programs claim the programs have 
increased enrollment, provided a more affordable education, and increased graduation 
rates (Delaney, 360). Despite these claims and the subsequent rise in popularity of 
GTPs, there are still questions and concerns regarding aspects of the GTPs, including 
determining the real change in the cost of college created by GTPs and the correlation 
between the changes in costs and the behaviors of participating students.  
I seek to contribute to the literature on these programs in two main ways. First, I 
analyze the reasons GTPs are implemented and who is likely to participate in these 
programs. Second, I investigate the impact GTPs have on students and universities. I 
hope that these findings will provide insights to students and families to help determine 
their compatibility with GTPs, and to inform policy makers of the motivations behind 
the implementation of GTPs, and their subsequent impacts.   
1.2 Research on Tuition and Guaranteed Tuition Programs (GTPs) 
 Economists and researchers have been interested in understanding and analyzing 
the broader issues regarding the demand for higher education and issues of 
affordability. Research has been conducted on a broad range of topics including price 
discrimination with tuition, the effectiveness of peer tutoring, the supply and demand of 
state appropriations, and the price elasticity of student populations. As it becomes more 
common to pursue a degree in higher education, the interest of analyzing the economic 
incentives and disincentives in the market for higher education has become more 
widespread.  
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The development of GTPs and the subsequent research analyzing them follows a 
similar trajectory. The amount of research about GTPs is growing, and provides 
valuable insight into their relationship with state appropriations and the impact they 
have on underrepresented communities. However, the existing research does not 
adequately explain the driving force behind the implementation of GTPs, nor does it 
encompass all impacts GTPs have on student success and behavior.  
 One main section of research that exists regarding GTPs is their relationship to 
the respective state budgets, which provides insight into the possible motivations for 
implementing or repealing a GTP.  Most recently in 2015, Delaney and Kearney 
analyzed the impact of state guaranteed tuition laws on state appropriations, which is 
the money set aside by the state (usually the state legislature) to fund higher education. 
Many public universities rely on substantial support from their state legislatures but the 
fluctuating and decreasing state appropriations have resulted in tuition becoming the 
main source of revenue for universities (College Board 2013).1 Delaney and Kearney 
discovered that the introduction of a guaranteed tuition law resulted in a 20% decrease 
in general state appropriations, on average, across affected institutions (Delaney & 
Kearney), although their research focuses on Illinois public institutions. Understanding 
the relationship between GTPs at public universities and their state appropriations is 
essential, especially for institutions that rely heavily on money from the state. Delaney’s 
analysis provides insight into the existing dependent relationship between GTPs and 
state appropriations.  
                                                        
1 During the economic recession there was a steady decline in state appropriations, but 
that has diminished and by 2013 the overall trend was a decrease of 0.4% 
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Included in my analysis is the impact state appropriations have on the 
implementation of GTPs, which is a step before Delaney’s analysis of the impact GTPs 
have on later state appropriations. In addition, large changes in state appropriations 
could impact the services available to students, thereby influencing student behavior, 
which I am analyzing.  
I was especially interested to explore existing research on the impact GTPs have 
on prospective and current students because of my focus on student behavior following 
the implementation of a GTP. Robertson (2007) examined price sensitivity before and 
after GTPs were implemented at minority-serving institutions.  In this research, price 
sensitivity refers to the degree to which the price (or increase in price) of tuition affects 
the purchasing behavior of students. Robertson found that both new and continuing 
students are price sensitive, but that new students were more price sensitive than 
continuing students. Since price-sensitivity affects the behavior of students, this finding 
provides insight into my analysis of student and institution changes following the 
implementation of a GTP. All else equal, the more price sensitive a student is, the more 
likely they will not remain enrolled when tuition prices increase or fluctuate. I will 
broaden these research findings at minority-seeking institutions by including all 
comparable public and private institutions that have implemented a GTP in the analysis.    
In addition to Robertson’s research on minority-seeking institutions, Morphew 
(2007) focused on the effect GTPs have on students who are underrepresented and poor. 
Morphew asserts that GTPs negatively impact underrepresented and poor students 
because the students are less likely to continue their education after increases in price. 
Furthermore, Morphew discusses the concept of persistence and the worthiness of this 
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argument. He explains that proponents of GTPs claim students will be more likely to 
persist and graduate because they face no price increase throughout the four years. This 
claim is precisely what I investigate in my research. The concept of persistence would 
have an impact on many decisions students would make, and could be represented 
through changes in completion rate, net debt amounts, and retention rates.  
Although these prior studies began to delve into the effect GTPs have on 
students and the progress on their degrees, I also wanted to review existing research on 
tuition increases and the impacts these have on student behavior. Since the 
implementation of a GTP may result in a price increase in year 1, research on the 
impact of sharp tuition increases may be relevant to analysis of GTPs. Shin and Milton 
(2006) looked at public universities to estimate the impact of tuition increases on 
enrollment, and found that enrollment was not affected by tuition and financial aid 
changes. Using Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) data they 
focused on FTFT enrollment and in-state tuition, although their dataset captured only 
three years of data. Hemelt and Marcotte (2011) examined the impact on enrollment due 
to rising tuition at public universities and found different results than Shin and Milton. 
Concluding that, at the mean, an increase of $100 resulted in a decline of 25 students, 
they continued on to determine multivariate and institution type results, which my 
analysis will mirror.  
Although Hemelt and Marcotte did not limit their research to GTPs, they do 
provide data specific to “very-large” tuition increases, which can be similar to the 
effects of GTPs in their initial year. Although these tuition increases are mirrored, GTPs 
have many more potential influences on student behavior, including the promise of 
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stability and predictability. Further investigation into enrollment at GTP participating 
institution could help determine between the influence of large tuition increases and the 
influence of these other factors.  
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Chapter 2: Marketing Schemes and Projections in Behavior 
2.1 Affordability versus Predictability   
When marketing GTPs to students, families, policy makers, and the community, 
many universities rely on the term “affordable” to describe the program’s attractiveness. 
When Adams State University implemented a guaranteed tuition program, the chair of 
their Board of Trustees Arnold Salazar proclaimed “This shows that we are committed 
to making education affordable and assuring students graduate with less debt” 
(Waechter, 2015). But, to thoroughly understand GTPs and the impact they have, it is 
necessary to unpack how exactly a GTP is “affordable,” and what this affordability 
encompasses. The general use of the term “affordable” is as an adjective describing 
something inexpensive or less expensive than a similar option with identical benefit or 
utility.2 However, in terms of GTPs, administrations do not always use the term 
affordable as something less expensive, but rather as a more predictable, stable, certain, 
or reliable program alternative to traditional tuition and subsequent yearly tuition 
increases.  The crux of this program is about managing the risk and uncertainty of future 
tuition increases, not actually making college affordable.  
Universities use the rhetoric of making college “affordable,” despite the fact that 
GTPs do not always result in cost savings, thereby employing an inaccurate marketing 
message. When the University of Arizona implemented a guaranteed tuition program in 
2014, UA President Ann Weaver Hart said, “I understand how critical it is to keep 
education affordable. The UA wants to see students graduate with the tools they need to 
                                                        2 This is not a formal definition, but rather how the term is generally used.   
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succeed in the workforce. To do that, we must make sure they can afford to attend” 
(Smiley, 2014). The success of the GTP marketing scheme, and thus GTPs, relies on the 
perception of affordability, which would result in lower total costs for students. 
However, GTP’s true effect is the stability of tuition costs over the years, and not 
necessarily monetary savings.  In actuality, a higher net tuition price with a GTP may be 
marketed, perceived, and believed to be more affordable, making the “affordability” 
marketing scheme misleading. The GTP is rooted in the theme of affordability through 
a fixed tuition model, but the very essence of the program does not guarantee a lower 
net cost to participants.3 The design and result of GTPs are equal or higher college 
costs, with increased predictability of costs, not increased affordability. These programs 
do provide stability and certainty about future costs, which provides value and can 
influence the preferences and decisions people make.  However, that stability should not 
be conflated with the monetary savings of an affordable option.   
Over time, the conflation of the concept of affordability with GTPs have 
transformed the cost savings of such plans into a pervasive myth, communicated by the 
administration and policy makers that control this message (or perhaps also believe this 
myth). This marketing approach, rooted in the demand for less expensive higher 
education options in the U.S., is successful at marketing GTPs. The myth of 
affordability influences the behavior of prospective participants, feeding on their fear of 
price instability when faced with increasing tuition price tags. Both the market and 
                                                        
3 GTPs do not offer consistent cost savings, according to my analysis  
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colloquial language result in the reification of the affordability myth, perpetuating the 
misunderstanding or misuse of this essential term.  
2.2 Economic Agents Behavior 
There are two main modern economic approaches regarding decision-making 
behavior: the neoclassical rational model and the behavioral model, which studies 
systematic departures from rational behavior. The rational individual is the ideal 
economic agent because it is rooted in traditional economic theory modeled on the 
assumption that people behave rationally (Ariely 2009). On the other hand, behavioral 
agents are more influenced by psychological factors, and these agents take into account 
social, environmental, cognitive, and psychological factors when making decisions. 
Since these agents are rooted in different theory, they would have different behavioral 
responses to a GTP. Below, I explain projected behavioral responses to a GTP based on 
the economic theory of rational agents (RAs) and behavioral econs (BEs).  
According to the traditional model, RAs behave rationally in decision making 
situations, choosing the option that will result in the highest level of expected utility. 
Utility, in economic terms, may be measured by emotional, monetary, material, or 
societal impacts, or often a combination of these.  Before coming to a decision, a RA 
consistently weighs and considers all available information, the costs and benefits of 
their preferences, and the probability of the events before them. In the context of a GTP, 
a rational agent would understand that under reasonable circumstances,4 the GTP will 
be revenue neutral with a 4-year graduation path. With all else held equal, a rational 
                                                        
4 No unpredictable changes in cost 
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agent would be indifferent when analyzing the cost savings between a GTP and 
traditional tuition path because in general there are no cost savings. An RA may 
appreciate or value a GTP for other reasons, because the predictability of a GTP means 
that the student’s annual costs would be stable. 
Contrary to the RA, the behavioral econ (BE) does not assume rationality. BEs 
have a tendency to suffer from projection bias, where they inaccurately perceive their 
future selves. This bias results in their current outlook clouding future judgments. Since 
GTPs rely on consistency and future planning due to the high initial price point, 
projection bias may have a significant impact to the affinity of a GTP. In addition, BEs 
suffer from short-term bias, and may be further discouraged by the GTP because of the 
high initial price point. A BE may be unable to accurately estimate their expected 
savings or lack thereof with a GTP because of their tendency to give more weight to the 
preferences and decisions in the short term. For example, a GTP may offer the BE 
higher expected predictability or perhaps perceived savings, but the BE will not be 
attracted to the GTP because of their over-weighting of short-term impacts.  
On the other hand, the BE lacks self-control, and could view the GTP as an 
opportunity to control their behavior through a commitment device. The path of higher 
education presents unpredictable scenarios. A student participating in a GTP could 
conceivably change majors, setting them back a year, or transfer to a different 
institution, thus exiting the GTP without reaping the full benefits of the initial additional 
investment. Likewise, in a non-GTP, the institution could raise tuition drastically or 
change policies that would impact their graduation track. To a BE, a GTP could serve 
then as a way to commit and control their unpredictable future scenarios. The initial 
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hike in tuition operates as a means of prepaying for the cost of their education.  Similar 
to a gym membership, a GTP could serve as a pre-commitment device, locking them in 
to a contract to mold future behavior and decision-making (Rogers 2014).  
When choosing a college, and thus the tuition program, it is not uncommon for 
familial and peer influences to play a large role in the prospective student’s decision. 
When this is the case, the prospective student’s preferences will be impacted and the 
model behavior, whether rational or irrational, will not be perfectly characterized. For 
example, using a GTP as a commitment device will be spread between multiple 
individuals, which impacts its effectiveness. Commitment devices are picked 
voluntarily, because individuals are aware of a difference between their current 
preferences and future goals and wish to control for that disparity (Rogers 2014). A 
GTP may not be an effective commitment device for a student and their parents if all of 
their current preferences and future goals do not align. This inconsistency would not 
allow a GTP to be an effective commitment device for paying for and completing 
college.  
When considering college attendance as a decision, each year the student 
decides to remain enrolled they weigh the alternate options and the costs and benefits 
associated with each possibility. In economics, this decision is described as marginal 
cost, where the change in total utility is calculated from a one-unit change in 
cost/benefit. In the behavioral situation of higher education, the marginal cost of going 
to one year of school is a year of work, income, experience, or time-off in the real 
world. 
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Since neither of these agents are certain to elect to prefer a GTP, an essential 
component of the success of a GTP is marketing it to prospective students and families. 
The perfect agent that would elect to choose the GTP would be risk averse with a low 
discount rate. This agent would prefer the guarantee and security of the GTP rather than 
taking a chance on potential tuition hikes of unknown sizes. In addition, they will not 
severely discount future decisions and their future rewards and punishments, making 
GTPs appear attractive because of the perception of cost savings in year 3 and 4 of the 
GTP. Institutions must appeal to potential students in such a way that the rational and irrational biases align, making them prefer the GTP.   
A GTP is an effective device to avoid risk. Students know that tuition will go up 
and are worried that those increases will be large enough to the point they cannot afford 
them. The GTP would serve as a standard attempt to reduce risk, and thus appeals to the 
risk averse agent.  Although, in models of risk aversion the effective strategy is to put 
the risk on those that can bear it the most, or in the situation where the statistical 
aggregation can mitigate the risk (Kahneman, 340). In some ways this program does not 
follow this strategy, because the risk is on the university, not the student or family. 
Universities are only able to adjust their anticipated tuition revenue for incoming 
cohorts of students, since the rest are locked in to a rate for the prescribed time. In 
general, students and families have more opportunities to diversify the weight of the 
risk and decisions, where the university may not have this flexibility.  
2.3 Motivations for the Institutions  
My research is centered around the motivation for implementing GTPs and the 
impact they have on student behavior. Above, I have outlined predicted student 
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behavior to a GTP, and the preferences they encounter. On the other hand, institutions 
have motivations and reservations regarding the GTP, how it is marketed, and what 
financial impact it has on the operations of the university. GTPs offer advantages to the 
university, especially in terms of recruitment, but there are also financial limitations.  
First and arguably the most important is the recruiting advantage of the GTP. I 
anticipate that much of the driving force on campuses considering the implementation 
of GTPs would come from the Admissions and Recruitment offices. The narrative of 
GTPs is marketable. In a society of fast rising and uncertain future costs for higher 
education and the increasing demand for a degree, the ability to promise students and 
families flat-tuition rates is a potential advantage. Students and families are promised a 
reliable rate that they can financially plan for throughout their track to graduation. 
When the University of Oregon was considering implementing a GTP, Roger 
Thompson, Vice President for Enrollment, explained this benefit at a student forum, 
“We are able to talk with families honestly and ethically about the total cost to earn a 
degree. We can’t do that if we don’t know what that’s going to be. That, to me, is the 
biggest benefit” (EMU, October 2015). When discussed at the University of Oregon, 
Thompson was a proponent of implementing a GTP, expressing the recruiting 
advantage as a motivation for choosing the program.  
The narrative of predictability appeals to the risk averse individual, who would 
prefer a guaranteed rate over risking sharp and unpredictable increases in tuition and fee 
rates. However, for this to be an advantage to the university, the marketing of a GTP 
must be precise in scope to ensure that the dependability of a GTP is at the forefront of 
the narrative, and the disadvantages are not. For example, the high initial price point is a 
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disadvantage to the prospective student, but a pointed marketing agenda could 
overcome the inflated price point (Kahneman, 338). In actuality, the individual must 
strongly prefer the dependability of the program to overcome any concerns about the 
higher tuition price in year one.  
 On the other hand, the financials of GTPs are more complicated. Similar to the 
advantage of financial planning for the student and their family, universities can plan 
and rely on set revenue for each cohort of students. After determining the rate of each 
cohort, there is a predictable stream of revenue that universities can financially plan 
for.5 However with that predictability comes a lack of flexibility. Apart from the 
incoming cohorts’ tuition rate, the university has very little flexibility in their tuition 
revenue. Universities that rely heavily on tuition revenue may face difficulties when 
faced with shortcomings. They do not have the ability to raise tuition rates for all 
undergraduate students, and must rather depend on the incoming cohort (about ¼ of 
undergraduate population) for any net revenue increases. At private institutions where 
most students to not pay the full tuition rate, they may compensate by giving out fewer 
scholarships.  
 At institutions that experience fluctuating amounts of support from foundations 
and/or the state, this inflexibility is heightened. The University of Oregon receives less 
state appropriations than comparable peer institutions, and thus relies more on tuition 
revenue.  When speaking at a forum, Jamie Moffit, the University of Oregon Vice 
President for Finance and Administration, explained that their university must be 
                                                        5 Apart from the small influx in enrollment and withdrawal rates that changes total 
undergraduate student numbers 
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willing to take on the financial risk that comes with the GTP. She explained, “If we hit a 
year where we have a dramatic cut [to the budget], we have to be willing to let our 
reserves drop” (EMU, October 2015). This inflexibility is a risk that universities 
considering GTPs must be willing to take on, and can limit feasibility of overcoming 
budget shortfalls.  Economic theory of efficient risk says that the risk should be borne 
by the agent that can handle it the easiest, which does not seem to be the university in 
this circumstance (Kahneman, 340).  
2.4 Hypothesis 
 Given that students do not behave rationally when planning for and choosing 
which school and program to invest in, the various motivations for an institution to 
implement a GTP, and diverse array of institutions in my dataset, I predict that there 
will not be many statistically significant findings in my regression analysis. I would 
assume that there are trends within subsets of institutions that are closely linked, but 
those trends may not be consistent enough to make a wide analysis of the motivations 
and impacts of a GTP that I wish to do. For example, all of the Illinois public schools 
switched to the program at the same time when mandated by the state legislature during 
an economic recession.  
These institutions are closely associated and rely on the same state 
appropriations, political atmosphere, economic conditions, and similar student 
characteristics. It is not unreasonable to believe that these institutions may have similar 
motivations for implementing a GTP, and thus may have similar results once the 
program is implemented. But, when my analysis is broadened to the 140 public and 
private schools, the motivations and impacts will not be consistent with the small set 
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Illinois schools. Analyzing correlation between small subsets of schools such as publics 
from a specific state or comparable peer institutions may garner more significant 
results, but I wish to analyze the larger picture of GTPs in general in the U.S. 
Depending on the results, an appropriate follow-up research project would be to hone in 
on different aspects of the program or similar subsets of participating institutions.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Data 
To determine the reasons for implementation and measure the impact of the 
implementation of guaranteed tuition programs, I relied on the Department of Education 
College Scorecard report. Originally released in September 2015, the College Scorecard 
is a compilation of data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System 
(IPEDS), the National Student Loan Data System (NSLDS), and the Department of 
Treasury. The intent of the College Scorecard is to provide transparent information for 
students, families, and researchers ‘about the costs and quality of institutions of higher 
education’ (3). In the case of my research, the College Scorecard served as an 
exhaustive, yet accessible, dataset that provided the foundation for my statistical 
analysis.  
 The majority of the data used for this project in the College Scorecard comes 
from IPEDS, an institution level data set including all reporting four-year higher 
education institutions in the United State. IPEDS serves as the main data collection 
program from the National Center for Education Statistics, and it includes performance 
data such as completion rates and tuition, and also contains intuitional information such 
as location, enrollment size and the amount of state appropriations received. The data 
provided through the IPEDS database is gathered through questionnaires. Any 
institution participating in the Title IV federal student aid program must complete these 
questionnaires. As a result, there are about 7,253 institutions that provide data to IPEDS 
annually, as of 2013 (IPEDS). In addition to IPEDS, the College Scorecard relies on 
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data and reports from the NSLDS, which is the Department of Education’s method for 
measuring federal student aid through student loans and Pell grants. These data are 
derived from federal borrowers and grant recipients since the 1960s (College 
Scorecard).  
 Before using data from the College Scorecard, I compiled a list of institutions 
that have implemented Guaranteed Tuition Programs, and the program details at each of 
these institutions. I assembled a dataset of 140 public and private universities that 
reported they had GTPs from lists of participating institutions available on IPEDS 
individual admissions or finance webpages. GTPs have varying characteristics, and I 
collected data on as many varying program details that I found including: state, public 
or private institution, year the GTP was implemented, how it was implemented, who is 
eligible, how long students can participate, whether fees are included, withdrawal result, 
eligibility of summer, online course participation, etc.  
 In the merged dataset, I took the College Scorecard data that did not match the 
types of institutions that were in my GTP specific dataset. I dropped for-profit schools, 
small baccalaureate and doctoral programs, and dropped small 4-year institutions.  This 
resulted in a final sample similar in size, which had comparable institutional 
characteristics.  
Although the final merged dataset had more than 150 variables, I focused on a few 
variables in my regression analysis. First, I chose state appropriations, and the 
subsequent annual change in state appropriations because of the strong link between 
public schools and state appropriations, which Delaney et al. discussed in their research 
(Delaney 359).  In addition, I chose retention rates of first year students, 4-year 
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completion rates, admission rates, cost of attendance, number of undergraduate degree-
seeking students, and net price. These are the core measures of institutional 
performance and student behavior, so I thought that these statistics could be initial 
identifiers of any pre-implementation patterns. Below is a table of their abbreviations, 
names, and explanations, as defined by IPEDS and/or the College Scorecard.  
Table I: Variable Abbreviation and Explanations 
Abbreviation Explanation 
adm_rate Admissions rate 
app Revenues received by an institution through acts of a 
legislative body, except grants and contracts.  
costt4_a The average annual total cost of attendance, including tuition 
and fees, books and supplies, and living expenses for all full-
time, first-time, degree/certificate-seeking undergraduates 
who receive Title IV aid. 
npt4 Average net price for public and private Title IV institutions. 
The average annual total cost of attendance (CostT4_A, 
CostT4_P), including tuition and fees, books and supplies, and 
living expenses, minus the average grant/scholarship aid. It is 
calculated for all full-time, first-time, degree/certificate-
seeking undergraduates who receive Title IV aid. 
overall_yr4_n Number of students in overall 4-year completion cohort 
ret_ft4 The proportion of full-time, first-time, degree/certificate-
seeking undergraduates who were enrolled at the institution in 
the fall 1 year after starting at the institution, calculated from 
the IPEDS Fall Enrollment component. 
ugds Enrollment of undergraduate degree-seeking students 
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In addition to the variable definitions, here are tables providing summary statistics of 
the 11-year database I use for statistical analysis, showing an initial comparison 
between institutions with and without GTPs.  
Table II: Summary Statistics of Variables without GTP 
   stats |     N        Mean      SD       Q1       Median   Q3 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Admission Rate  | 4341      .654       .189     .550      .683       .792 
Retention Rate   | 4556       .772      .107      .709      .770       .841 
State App           | 2573       106.76   106.3    40.3      65.0      130.4 
  Cost of Attend    | 2233       24822   12284   16682    19687   28751 
  Net Price            | 4615       7548      9168       0            0        13964 
            4-year Comp      | 4136       2564      3286    1259      1972     3076 
Table III: Summary Statistics of Variables with GTP 
stats |     N        Mean      SD       Q1       Median   Q3 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Admission Rate | 339     .660       .148     .559       .648       .763 
Retention Rate | 340       .763       .099      .701      .766       .831 
State App           | 246      130.6    132.9      39.7      76.7      206.5 
Cost of Attend    | 214      20021    5308    16766    19791    21954 
               Net Price           | 340     8248       7015       0         9716    14136 
4-year Comp    | 297      2988      1791    1633      2705      3951 
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3.2 Statistical Analysis 
To most analyze the data, I created a panel dataset, separated by year, combined 
with the College Scorecard data,6 IPEDS state appropriation data, and the dataset with 
GTP details. The panel design is most compatible with datasets with a large number of 
variables and observations (N) over a short people of time (T). My data is set up in a 
similar form, where N was the individual school information over 11 years.  This 
separates all available information by year, leaving variables of interest in a consistent 
yearly distribution despite the large sample and small distribution of time. This 
empirical design is appropriate for before and after studies, where the implementation 
of a GTP represents the moment of impact. In this form, I am able to control for 
measurable characteristics, such as exogenous independent variables implicit in 
regression analysis, to the best of my ability.  
In the panel dataset, each panel is separated by individual year, making the time 
variable year, resulting in a panel dataset spanning 11 years, 2003-2013. Although the 
panel dataset is in the form of years (denoted as yr), there were other time related 
variables that I used in my statistical analysis. First, I used the variable date to indicate 
the year in which the GTP begins at a new school, so the implementation of a GTP in 
2009 would be represented by date = 2009. Second, I generated a descriptive variable 
that calculated the difference between the year in the panel and the date of 
implementation where years_before= date- yr. This variable, years_before, followed a 
continuous model where five represents five years prior to the implementation, zero 
                                                        6 The College Scorecard database is updated routinely. The data I used for my research 
was last updated March 2, 2016.  
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represents the implementation year, and negative three represents the third year 
following the implementation. In addition, I generated dummy variables coded as the 
implementation year where 0= no GTP and 1=GTP to flag the year in which each 
school implemented a GTP. These dummy variables provided a more consistent method 
for analyzing the impact of GTPs by serving as a flagged variable for each institution’s 
implementation year.  
When analyzing my panel data, I had two main areas of focus: to determine why 
schools choose to implement a GTP and what effect the implementation has on school 
characteristics. To begin, I looked at the means of my variables of focus throughout the 
11-year time span of the years_before variable.  
 
Table IV: Mean Values by Year Pre GTP Implementation 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
years before| app        costt4_a         npt4        overall_yr4_n adm_rate ret_rate 
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  1 |    114.3       19608.3      4262.184       2548.9      .699        .748 
  2 |    116.3        21880         5109.816        2936        .717       .749 
  3 |    116.37      20771.3      4515.974       2879.5      .702       .751 
  4 |    130.6        20151.4      6636.269       3232.9      .738       .744 
  5 |    150.0        20614.1      2479.022       3490.9      .701       .759 
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Table V: Mean Values by Year Pre GTP Implementation 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
years_before|   app        costt4_a      npt4   overall_yr4_n adm_rate ret_rate 
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-5 |   184.2     22022         10454       22022         .591    .789 
-4 |    98.3      18900.5      7795.2      18900.5      .686    .750 
-3 |    95.6      17803.2      6787.1      17803.2      .697    .754 
-2 |    97.7     16905.8       7022.9      16905.8      .692    .760 
-1 |    109.6    16625.1       3465.3    16625.1       .694    .767 
0 |    113.2     17582.6       952.9       17582.6      .666    .755 
 
In this table, the dummy variable years_before is represented on the left-hand side 
with the values ranging from -5 to 5. The vertical columns represent the number of 
schools (N), and mean of each of the variables. I used these tables as a tool of 
descriptive analysis, determining if there were any notable patterns or dramatic changes 
in any variables that may be related to a GTP. In the four years leading up to the switch, 
mean retention rates increase from 0.7495 to 0.7667 the year before the implementation, 
a deviation of 0.0172. Mean net price had a large decrease the year of implementation 
(from $3,465 to $952) and then jumped up again in second year of the guarantee to a 
price higher than before the guarantee ($952 to $4,262). Similarly to net price, cost of 
attendance had a large jump in year 2 of the implementation. The four-year completion 
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numbers were relatively level (within 200 students from one another) the two years 
leading up to and following the implementation of the guarantee, and jumped up by 
about 800 in the 4th and 5th years following the implementation, which would be the 
first and second cohorts of students with the guaranteed rate. Lastly, admissions rates 
and undergraduate degree seeking students enrolled followed similar trends with a slow 
increase throughout the 11-year time period. This is consistent with the increase in 
popularity of a higher education degree. Based on these observations of descriptive 
patterns, I decided to further investigate these changes through two types of regressions.   
I used two methods to investigate statistical significance, which allows me to 
answer my two questions: what are the motivations for GTP implementation and what 
effects does implementation of a GTP have on institution variables. To examine 
institutional patterns leading up to the implementation of GTPs, I relied on a variation 
of a hazard model with a truncated dataset. To focus on the potential motivations to 
implement a GTP, I used the years_before data to determine the time period leading up 
to the implementation date for each individual institution, represented in Tables IV and 
V.I deleted any data following the year of implementation because I am trying to 
explain why schools chose to implement GTPs. This model is represented as: 
yit = α + β xit + vi + εit 
In this analysis, yit is my dependent variable (the change to guarantee) with the value 0 
(does not have GTP) or 1 (has GTP),  xit are my independent variables which are the 
school characteristics that vary by school and time,, and β are the coefficients that I 
want estimates of, and ), vi + εit are my error terms within the random effects model. 
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The error term consists of school specific errors represented by vi and the error that vary 
by school and time represented by εit.  
Effect of GTP Implementation: 
I relied on a variation of a time series regression model to analyze institutional 
changes following the implementation of a GTP. The regression model is represented 
as: 
yt = β + β xt + β xit-1 + εt 
Here, yt is the dependent variable represented by each of the six variables that I focused 
on. The βxt terms are the various independent variables that may bear influence on the 
dependent outcome, including the implementation of the guarantee.   
Using the original panel dataset sorted annually by institution, I stored the 
lagged years_before variable over an 11 year time period. For each institution, I had 
data and dummy variables for five years leading up to the switch to guarantee, the year 
of the switch, and five years following the switch. These lagged variables allowed me to 
investigate whether there are any changes from the trend of university outcomes leading 
up to the implementation, and to determine whether the implementation affects any 
changes in behavior.  
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Chapter 4: Analysis 
4.1 Results 
Motivations for GTP Implementation: 
Based on the patterns represented in Tables IV and V, I did three hazard model 
regressions to identify variables that may influence the decision to implement the GTP.   
Table VI: Regression Output of Guarantee Implementation and Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Guarantee 
All variables 
Guarantee 
Removed 4  
Variables 
N=479 
Guarantee 
Removed 2 
Variables 
N=476 
    
app 1.71e-05   
 (5.23e-05)   
ugds 0.00225**  0.00269*** 
 (0.00107)  (0.000862) 
adm_rate 0.0191 -0.0290** -0.0332** 
 (0.0151) (0.0125) (0.0141) 
ret_ft4 -0.0743 -0.00321 -0.0305 
 (0.0476) (0.0323) (0.0363) 
npt4 -0.00155 -2.14e-05 -0.000108 
 (0.00113) (0.000130) (0.000151) 
costt4_a 0.00141   
 (0.00121)   
overall_yr4_n -0.00299  -0.000429 
 (0.00417)  (0.00200) 
Constant 0.0222 0.054 0.0488 
 (0.0381) (0.0278) (0.0308) 
    
Observations 878 4,317 3,893 
Number of unitid 299 479 476 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The table above represents three regressions with the guarantee as the dependent 
variable, denoted as the three vertical columns of results. The various explanatory 
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variables are listed on the left and correspond to the coefficient value in each column. 
The coefficient value is the value for the regression equation predicting the change in 
guarantee from each independent variable, holding all other variables constant. The 
asterisks represent the corresponding p-values used in testing the null hypothesis that 
the coefficient is 0. The first regression had all core variables included, which resulted 
in a small sample size. To get a larger sample, I removed state appropriations, 
undergraduate enrollment, completion numbers, and cost of attendance, amounting to a 
sample of N=479. Then, I performed a regression including everything but cost of 
attendance and state appropriations, amounting to a sample N=476.  
Working with the basis of at least 90% confidence, a p-value of ≤ 0.1 would be 
required for any result to be statistically significant. Given that standard, undergraduate 
degree seeking student enrollment and admissions rates have significant results, but the 
change is minimal. For the first regression, undergraduate student enrollment is 
significant (p-value<0.05) with a coefficient of 0.002, meaning that the larger the 
undergraduate student population, the more likely the institution is to implement a GTP. 
In the second regression, admissions rate has a statistically significant coefficient of -
0.029, meaning that with the change to a GTP, we expect a decrease of 0.029 in 
admissions rates, holding all other variables constant. In the last regression with most of 
the variables and a large N both the coefficients for undergraduate enrollment and 
admissions rate are significant. Holding all other variables in the regression constant, 
the implementation of a GTP is correlated with an increase of 269 undergraduate 
students, and a decrease in admissions rate of 3.3% (with a relatively large standard 
error of 0.014). 
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Although these results are statistically significant, I am doubtful that these translate 
to real effects with GTP implementation. When a new tuition plan is implemented, 
many other variables are changing as well, including but not limited to price of 
education, marketing and recruitment strategies, and outcome variables such as 
completion. These results are significant when holding all other variables in the 
regression constant, which will not happen in most institutional settings.  
To investigate these pre-GTP patterns further, I did a second similar regression 
analysis using lagged independent variables to focus on effects over time.  
Table VII: Regression Output of Guarantee Implementation and Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Guarantee 
All Variables 
Guarantee 
Remove 2 
N=319 
Guarantee 
Remove 1 
N=453 
    
app_lag2 0.000137** 9.07e-05**  
 (5.84e-05) (4.61e-05)  
ugds_lag2 -0.00123  0.000491 
 (0.000995)  (0.000637) 
adm_rate_lag2 0.00851 0.00631 0.00602 
 (0.0188) (0.0186) (0.0131) 
ret_ft4_lag2 -0.0671 -0.0808* -0.0446 
 (0.0500) (0.0488) (0.0323) 
npt4_lag2 -0.000158 -0.000246 -0.000124 
 (0.000306) (0.000297) (0.000152) 
overall_yr4_n_lag2 0.000446  0.000457 
 (0.00272)  (0.00194) 
Constant 0.0696 0.0725 0.0428 
 (0.0403) (0.0401) (0.0276) 
    
Observations 2,382 2,386 3,392 
Number of unitid 319 319 453 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
These results had more statistical significance than the previous regressions using the 
original variables. Using two-year lagged variables, state appropriations were 
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statistically significant with the all-inclusive variable regression model and the 
regression with a few variables omitted. The coefficients are 0.000137 and 0.0000907 
with a p-value< 0.01 and p-value<0.05 respectively. This means that when a GTP is 
implemented, an estimated increase of $13.7 and $9.1 million in state appropriations 
will occur. Both of the coefficients are positive, demonstrating that there is a positive 
relationship between the implementation of a GTP and state appropriations. Although 
these results are significant, the standard errors are large (between 0.00046 and 
0.00058). To further analyze state appropriations, I did a similar regression analysis 
with the dependent guarantee variable and state appropriations and other institutional 
characteristics as 1-year lags and change between the variable and 1 year lags. Neither 
of these regressions was statistically significant, suggesting that it may take multiple 
years of a pattern to form before affecting the implementation of a GTP.  
The other results were not significant, but the results are interesting. There is a 
negative association for retention rates and net price, which is consistent with Tables IV 
and V. This suggests that a GTP may be implemented if these are decreasing. The 
admissions rate coefficient is slightly positive, as is the completion cohort, both of 
which are consistent with the growing undergraduate enrollment represented in Tables 
IV and V.    
Effects of GTP Implementation: 
To test the descriptive patterns in Tables IV and V, I did time series regressions on 
the variables I focused on. The regression results are listed on the following page.  
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Table VIII: Regression Output of Retention Rates and Control Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ret_ft4 
All variables 
ret_ft4 
Removed 
student 
demographics 
ret_ft4 
Removed  
median debt  
amounts 
ret_ft4 
Removed first  
generation 
     
guarantee -0.00728 -0.0103 -0.00699 -0.00726 
 (0.0111) (0.0116) (0.0120) (0.0113) 
control -0.0346*** -0.0332*** -0.0170* -0.0333*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0106) (0.0103) (0.0102) 
satmt75 0.000396*** 0.000419*** 0.000379*** 0.000389*** 
 (6.24e-05) (6.27e-05) (5.84e-05) (6.21e-05) 
satvr75 0.000196*** 0.000185*** 0.000225*** 0.000192*** 
 (6.18e-05) (6.23e-05) (5.71e-05) (6.13e-05) 
ugds_white -0.0141*** -0.00751 -0.0116*** -0.0135*** 
 (0.00482) (0.00467) (0.00449) (0.00479) 
ugds_black -0.0173*  -0.00738 -0.0161* 
 (0.00983)  (0.00935) (0.00973) 
ugds_hisp 0.0408***  0.0417*** 0.0415*** 
 (0.0107)  (0.0103) (0.0106) 
ugds_asian 0.0552***  0.0646*** 0.0540*** 
 (0.0193)  (0.0188) (0.0192) 
firstgen_yr4_n -5.61e-06 -6.71e-06 5.65e-06  
 (1.08e-05) (1.10e-05) (1.06e-05)  
pell_yr4_n 1.01e-05** 1.27e-05*** 3.19e-06 7.88e-06*** 
 (4.45e-06) (4.49e-06) (4.00e-06) (2.14e-06) 
lo_inc_debt_m
dn 
2.70e-06** 2.87e-06**  2.73e-06** 
 (1.27e-06) (1.28e-06)  (1.26e-06) 
md_inc_debt_
mdn 
-2.76e-07 -1.55e-06  -3.04e-07 
 (1.68e-06) (1.68e-06)  (1.67e-06) 
hi_inc_debt_m
dn 
7.71e-07 1.98e-06*  6.57e-07 
 (1.12e-06) (1.09e-06)  (1.11e-06) 
Constant 0.400*** 0.390*** 0.420*** 0.405*** 
 (0.0308) (0.0311) (0.0302) (0.0307) 
     
Observations 972 972 994 972 
Number of 
unitid 
294 294 299 294 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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To begin my regression analysis, I compiled a list of as many potential control 
variables as possible, represented in the left hand column of this table. I included 
institutional characteristics such as public or private and student characteristics such as 
the 75th percentile of verbal and math SAT scores, the race of undergraduate enrollment, 
amount of Pell eligible and first generation college students, median debt amounts by 
income level, and the guarantee dummy variable. I experimented with removing certain 
student characteristics within each regression, attempting to determine which group of 
control variables will most adequately control for measurable characteristics affecting 
GTPs and outcome variables. I used the initial exhaustive list of control variables for 
the remainder of regressions.  
Similar to the regression above, I did various regressions keeping the variables of 
interest the dependent variable and included various control variables. The results of 
this regression are represented in Table VIII, listed on the following page.  
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Table IX: Regression Output of Core and Control Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES adm_rate app costt4_a npt4 overall_yr4_
n 
      
guarantee 2.27e-05 26.13 0.987 -0.0125 0.173*** 
 (0.0270) (16.99) (0.693) (0.593) (0.0629) 
control 0.00158  15.81*** 8.253*** -0.0961* 
 (0.0254)  (0.626) (0.553) (0.0562) 
satmt75 -0.000503*** 0.303*** 0.00454 0.00625* 0.000661*** 
 (0.000178) (0.0706) (0.00299) (0.00365) (0.000230) 
satvr75 -0.000124 0.0608 0.00278 0.00535 0.000601*** 
 (0.000180) (0.0629) (0.00287) (0.00366) (0.000217) 
ugds_white 0.0363** 3.750 0.129 0.344 -0.00458 
 (0.0141) (4.341) (0.224) (0.286) (0.0169) 
ugds_black -0.135*** 1.504 -1.030** 0.0402 -0.0480 
 (0.0284) (8.714) (0.462) (0.579) (0.0350) 
ugds_hisp -0.0342 -4.961 1.138** -1.785*** -0.146*** 
 (0.0310) (9.848) (0.497) (0.630) (0.0376) 
ugds_asian -0.164*** -52.86*** 3.996*** -0.173 -0.136** 
 (0.0566) (16.87) (0.894) (1.146) (0.0673) 
firstgen_yr4_
n 
6.51e-05** 0.0472*** 0.00145** 0.00233*** 0.00137*** 
 (2.85e-05) (0.0166) (0.000576) (0.000604) (4.68e-05) 
pell_yr4_n -2.68e-05** -0.00481 -0.000244 -0.000794*** 0.000702*** 
 (1.23e-05) (0.00766) (0.000225) (0.000255) (1.77e-05) 
lo_inc_debt_
mdn 
-5.28e-06 0.000167 2.39e-05 5.74e-05 8.90e-06* 
 (3.58e-06) (0.00158) (6.15e-05) (7.37e-05) (4.74e-06) 
md_inc_debt_
mdn 
9.33e-06* -5.74e-05 0.000237*** 0.000182* 4.92e-06 
 (4.94e-06) (0.00196) (7.77e-05) (0.000100) (5.84e-06) 
hi_inc_debt_
mdn 
-6.19e-06* -0.00187 0.000467*** 0.000259*** -7.51e-07 
 (3.29e-06) (0.00133) (5.12e-05) (6.64e-05) (3.84e-06) 
o.control  -    
      
Constant 1.041*** -115.9*** -13.27*** -10.93*** -0.528*** 
 (0.0814) (38.74) (1.659) (1.724) (0.136) 
      
Observations 972 619 972 972 972 
Number of 
unitid 
294 228 294 294 294 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Similar to the regressions analyzing the motivations for the implementation of 
GTPs, there is not a lot of statistical significance in these regressions. When analyzing 
this, we want to focus on the independent variable guarantee to determine what affect, if 
any, it has on the core institutional variables. The only regression that was statistically 
significant was the correlation between the four-year completion cohort with a p-value 
<0.01 and a co-efficient value of 0.173. The four-year completion cohort is measured in 
real numbers. So, we expect that a GTP cohort would be 0.173 higher than a non-GTP 
cohort, since guarantee is coded 0/1.  This variable is represented as the number of 
students in their 4-year completion cohort, so this would be the equivalent to 173 
additional students. This is reasonable since undergraduate enrollment is steadily 
increasing, so we would expect more students to be in each year’s completion cohort. 
 Although the results are not significant, GTPs and admission rates have a 
positive association with a co-efficient of 0.0027. State appropriations also have a 
positive association with a co-efficient of 26.13, although this is also not significant. 
This finding seems to go against Delaney’s et al. conclusion that there is a negative 
association between the implementation of a GTP and subsequent state appropriations. 
Net price has a slight negative association, and cost of attendance has a slight positive 
association, but both of these stand errors are large and the coefficients are not 
significant. Of the four regressions I did on retention in Table IX, all of the coefficients 
were negative ranging from 0.001 to 0.06, but none were statistically significant.  
These results are consistent with my hypothesis that most of the motivations and 
impacts of a guaranteed tuition program may not be statistically significant. There are 
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many other factors that influence the effectiveness of GTPs, outlined in section 4.2, that 
may influence the motivations and effects of GTPs and thus impact the significance of 
changes before or after the implementations of GTPs.  
4.2 Implications and Avenues for Further Research  
I view this research as a starting point for avenues of further exploration. I focused 
on two main questions: why might a GTP be implemented, and what effect does this 
GTP have. To my knowledge, this is one of the most thorough GTP datasets collected, 
but there are unfortunately still gaps in information. Overall, there was a relatively 
small amount of data available, limiting the ability and power to find significant 
differences with GTPs, if they exist. I think having more access to individual student 
data will be the best avenue for further significant discoveries in the future regarding 
GTPs. This will allow analysis on more specific details of GTPs and their affects, such 
as the difference and impacts opt-in and opt-out GTPs have on institutional 
characteristics and student behavior.  
My statistical analysis had an element of simplicity, where my regressions focused 
on six core variables, controlling for as much variability and codependency as possible. 
I chose to do a time series approach structured as panel data, but could have done a 
different model such as a difference in difference analysis. Past research on GTPs have 
relied on difference in difference models, such as Delaney etc.; However, I believe that 
a panel dataset with GTP information was more suited to my broad analysis.  
The analysis spans a time period of 11 years, which is relatively short when 
analyzing drastic or significant changes in student behavior. As more institutions adopt 
this program, or as current participating institutions switch back to a traditional model, 
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more data will become available to analyze. One of my main limitations in my 
regressions was the small sample size that I had. Through my research I was able to find 
detailed information on 140 private and public institutions that have implemented a 
GTP. When analyzing the significance of the GTP in the time period of only one year 
that results in a maximum sample size (N) of 140, and of those some will have missing 
values. When regressing changes over many years, my N was larger although my group 
size is still maximized at 140. Over time, this N will grow, and more data will be 
available as more institutions test this program.  
In addition, these 140 institutions were derived by my personal outreach and 
research with participating institutions. Significant portions of the detailed dataset of 
GTPs and their characteristics have missing values due to information that was not 
available to the public, and which I was unable to obtain from my outreach.  Thus, I was 
unable to acquire an updated exhaustive list of GTP characteristics from each 
participating institution. The base of this dataset, the institutions with GTPs, was reliant 
on self-reporting from institutions to the IPEDS database. This may not have provided a 
comprehensive list of participating institutions. As this program becomes more popular, 
my hope is that more institutions will provide details of their participation to help the 
development of research in this field.  
Next, I chose a few main variables to focus on. Based on my research, these 
variables seemed to be most present within the debate of GTPs. These variables do not 
encompass all potential effects GTPs have on the higher education process. It is 
becoming increasingly popular to think of return on investments while investing in a 
degree and I think more analysis could be given to the concept of return on investments, 
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and how this is related to GTPs. Assuming rationality, prospective students and families 
will perceive higher education as an investment, and will weigh the costs and benefits 
of this investment. Prospective students and families would seek the investment in 
knowledge that offers the best interest rates with increasing economic returns (such as 
quality of a degree). But since this program is aimed at reducing risk and not reducing 
cost, I do not predict that this would significantly alter student’s returns on investment.  
In addition, I would perform more research in the areas of completion and time to 
degree. The efficiency of completing a college degree is paramount to other factors that 
impact institutional and student characteristics. The opportunity cost of completing a 
degree early or late is significant, and would impact other related variables like 
cumulative net price, return on investment, and net student debt. If possible, I would 
spend more time comparing and contrasting completion rates and time to degree, and 
their relation to GTPs. When calculating for total cost, a rational prospective student 
would sum the amount of perceived years required to obtain their degree, and the 
predictability and upfront price of a GTP may influence this. This relationship could be 
a follow-up research study to delve more into years needed for a degree.  
Lastly, there are various variables I wish I could have analyzed as outcome variables 
or used as controls in my regressions.  There are countless immeasurable variables that 
may also be having an impact on the variables that I focused on and their relation to 
GTPs. Changes in tuition plans can be motivated by changes in administration, pressure 
from outside forces such as the state, economic conditions, supply and demand of a 
degree, and preferences of the students.  
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I used state appropriations that are related (but not perfectly correlated) to state 
preferences and economic conditions, but most of these variables do not report on these 
factors in any consistent way. Despite what I concluded from my analysis, there is no 
way to completely eliminate the confounding of various factors that tie in to the higher 
education market, and thus have an impact on GTPs and its related effects. 
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